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The financial crisis has taught regulators and
lawmakers a lot – not least that financial super-
vision needs to be much more integrated inter-
nationally. The crisis has brought financial su  -
per    visors of different countries closer together.
Supervisory colleges, in which home and host
country supervisors of international banking
groups share information, exchange views and
consult each other, existed even before the 
crisis. But now they are institutionalized, and
cooperation has become much more intensive.
In the European Union the internationalization
of supervision is very wide-ranging. But the
EU also provides the legal framework which
we do not have at the global level, of course.
But even within Europe we run up against our
own borders, for example, when branches of
law are not harmonized and lie within the sole
jurisdiction of Member States. There is also the
question of burden-sharing. Supervisory
measures in times of crisis are costly – and
generally financed out of taxpayers’ money,
the spending of which is the prerogative of
individual states only. 
With its reform of the European supervisory
architecture, the outcome of which is the
European System of Financial Supervisors, the
European Union has at any rate taken a first
giant step – in the right direction. Supervision
must not be tied to jurisdictions, for the firms
in question are not either. In order to be able
to function effectively, supervision must be
international, or at least European.
In Europe we now have a hybrid supervisory
system: although national supervisory author-
ities as a matter of principle still remain
responsible for “their” firms – and that is the
way it must be if only for the reasons stated
above – there are now three European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) with wide-
ranging powers.
The ESAs radically change the way national
supervisory authorities work. Subject to certain
conditions, they may issue instructions to
national authorities. If the latter fail to act on
these instructions, the ESAs may, as a last
resort, take decisions directly binding on firms,
for example, if national authorities are not
applying Community law or are not applying
it correctly. If disaster should descend upon
the financial markets again, the ESAs will also
be involved in crisis management and “shall
actively facilitate and, where deemed neces-
sary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the
relevant national competent supervisory
authorities”. Although many details still need
to be spelled out, the means to act in a coordi-
nated fashion – in crises but also especially
before crises arise – are now available.
With the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) the EU has remedied another great
deficiency that the crisis revealed, at least in
Europe: undesirable macroeconomic develop-
ments that represented a risk not only to the
stability of individual firms, but also to that of
the whole financial system, could previously
not be identified early enough – or even not at
all if they arose beyond a country’s own
national borders. And even if these problems
could at least be foreseen, the transmission
from the macro to the micro level, the super-
vision of individual institutions, frequently did
not work. It was therefore right to establish
the ESRB as a European watchdog and to link
its macroprudential oversight with the super-
vision of individual institutions.
The global responses to the crisis, as formulated
by standard setters such as the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, are being incorporat-
ed into the European legal framework and are
as a result being given the binding nature that
they just do not have globally. This framework
is being fleshed out by technical standards,
developed by the ESAs and adopted by the EU
Commission, which are immediately applica-
ble law in all EU Member States. The national
supervisory authorities are collaborating on
this major maximum harmonization project.
They are doing this in the ESAs, which have
been given a democratic organizational struc-
ture. The key decision-making bodies of the
ESAs are the Boards of Supervisors, in which
the national supervisory authorities are voting
members. Until further notice, it is in these
Boards that the course of European financial
supervision will be set – a course that will
hopefully be successful.
POST-CRISIS INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SUPERVISION
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n this paper, we seek empirical
evidence for information rents in
loan spreads by analyzing a sample
of UK syndicated loan contracts for
the period from 1996 to 2005. We use
various measu  res for borrower
opaqueness and control for bank,
borrower and loan characteristics
and we find that undercapitalized
banks charge loan spreads that are
approximately 34 bps higher for
loans to opaque borrowers. We fur-
ther analyze whether this effect per-
sists throughout the business cycle
and find that this effect prevails
only during recessions. However, we
do not find evidence that banks
exploit their information monopo-
lies during expansion phases. 
The costs of bank-borrower relationships
have received scant research attention. We
argue that the costs that are associated with
lending relationships are economically sig-
nificant. We show that capital-constrained
banks exploit their information monopolies
over borrowers that have high costs for
switching lenders by charging higher loan
spreads than their well-capitalized peers
(the “weak bank effect”). This effect prevails
only in recessions. However, we find evi-
dence of the commitment of lenders to their
borrowers during expansion phases. 
UNIQUE DATA SET COMPRISED MAINLY OF 
PRIVATE FIRMS
Syndicated loans play a major role in cor-
porate finance by providing access to a
large quantity of capital that even exceeds
the annual issuance volume of equity and
bond markets. In our empirical analysis,
we employ a data set of UK syndicated
loan agreements for the time period 1996
to 2005. Because private companies in the
UK are legally required to disclose their
financial statements to the UK Companies
House, this data set confers upon this
study a notable advantage over prior
research in this area. Information prob-
lems are typically greater for private
firms, which constitute the majority of
firms in our data sample. The theoretical
models that provide the foundation for
this study rely on the existence of private
information that is not observable by out-
siders; this assumption is particularly rel-
evant for our sample. As a consequence,
we are able to provide greater insight into
the size of the informational rents that
banks can earn in the syndicated loan
market.
RELATIONSHIP LENDERS HAVE AN INFORMA-
TION MONOPOLY OVER OUTSIDE INVESTORS 
We seek empirical evidence for informa-
tion monopolies, building on the theoret-
ical models of Greenbaum et al. (1989)
and Rajan (1992). These authors show
that relationship lenders have an infor-
mation monopoly over outside investors
and that these monopolies effectively lock
in borrowers and enable banks to extract
monopoly rents. This information dispar-
ity stems from the uncertainty of outside
investors in evaluating the quality of bor-
rowers. We recognize two dimensions of
4
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selection (winner’s curse) problem.
Second, there are external events that
amplify the adverse selection component.
We find that increased uncertainty arising
from macroeconomic fluctuations is
important to understanding bank behav-
ior with respect to loan pricing when
information problems are elevated. 
Bank credit policies fluctuate during the
business cycle, and they vary counter-
cyclically. Evidently, there is some varia-
tion in the credit policies of banks, and a
sharp tightening of credit standards in the
early 1990s and 2000 overlaps with peri-
ods of economic contraction. Lending
standards appear to vary for both small
and large borrowers in a similar manner.
This phenomenon is explained in the lit-
erature by the profit-maximizing behav-
ior of banks rather than the carelessness
of bankers. During recessions, the average
quality of borrowers in the pool of credit
applicants is low. Therefore, the costly
screening process serves to identify high-
quality borrowers from this pool. As there
is a high probability that credit assess-
ments turn out to be negative, the mar-
ginal benefit from screening is low and so
is the intensity of screening, as well as
lending volume, during these periods. If
the economy improves, the average qual-
ity of borrowers improves as well, which
increases the probability that credit
assessments are positive. This, in turn,
enhances the marginal benefit of screen-
ing by increasing the intensity of screen-
ing by banks.
However, beyond some point, the average
quality becomes excessively high, the mar-
ginal benefits from screening decrease, and
the screening intensity is again reduced.
Credit standards are lax in good times;
therefore, the default risk of the portfolios
of banks increases. This concern is particu-
larly relevant for poorly capitalized banks.
If the bad loans that are extended in good
times are defaulted during recessions, then
these banks might suffer severely in terms
of their capital, and this effect would com-
promise their financial stability. It is thus a
natural question whether these banks
price their loans differently compared with
well-capitalized ones.
WEAK BANKS CHARGE HIGHER SPREADS TO 
BORROWERS WITH HIGH SWITCHING COSTS
Comparing borrowers with high and low
switching costs, we find that undercapital-
ized banks charge higher loan spreads in
loans to firms, who thus encounter high
switching costs. This effect is shown to be
statistically and economically significant. We
find that information monopolies exist in
periods of economic contraction: only weak
banks raise their spreads above the level that
is justified by the credit risk for borrowers
with a high cost of switching lenders. This
finding is consistent with reputation consid-
erations and discretion in bank loan commit-
ments. Ambiguity regarding borrower finan-
cial health, which is the initial motivation for
information monopolies, also causes banks to
renege in adverse situations. Banks place
their reputations at risk by offering these
loan commitments. Well-capitalized banks
honor their commitments by choosing not to
exploit their information monopolies and
thus enhancing their reputation (and poten-
tially increasing their future fee income). In
contrast, preserving the financial health of
weak banks outweighs the benefits of pre-
serving their future reputations, and they
charge their borrowers higher spreads. These
results are robust to alternative proxies for
bank and macroeconomic risk.
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T
hree years after the peak of the
recent financial crisis, reforms to
regulate executive compensation are
beginning to take hold. Companies are
fine-tuning their executive compensa-
tion programs and governance processes
with a view to implementing recently
legislated regulation. Therefore, it is
time for an analysis of the functioning
of this relatively new legislative frame-
work. 
Leaving regulatory changes aside, recent
surveys of executive pay practices show
clear evidence of companies focusing on a
tightened link between compensation and
performance. This is particularly well
reflected by the development of perform-
ance-related salary in Germany over the
years. After the amendment of the German
Stock Corporation Act (1998) facilitating the
capital increase and the redemption of
shares for corporations, the percentage of
variable pay rose from 16% to 70% in 2005.
The pay tied to stock amounted to 20.8% of
total compensation after the recent financial
crisis in 2010 (see Figure 1). This development
is in stark contrast to the composition of the
much higher executive pay in the United
States, where in 2010 stock-based pay com-
prised in total 51% (see Figure 2).
Despite these differences, there is evidence 
in both corporate governance systems of
existing agency problems, because the ability
of executives to extract high levels of com-
pensation seems to decrease with a rising
degree of ownership concentration. This evi-
dence fits squarely with the so-called “mana  -
gerial power” hypothesis that calls into ques-
tion the functioning of contracting mecha-
nisms in the area of executive compensation
agreements and is concerned about the corre-
lation between pay and performance.  
BENCHMARKS
In the “Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vor  -
standsvergütung” (Law on the Approp  ria  -
teness of Director Compensation) of June 18,
2009, the German legislator has tried to 
reconcile these two approaches. By referring
REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE PAY IN GERMANY –
PERSPECTIVES OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTING AND MANAGERIAL POWER
Brigitte Haar
Goethe University
Figure 1: Executive Board Compensation of the DAX-Listed Companies in 2010
29.00% Base Salary 20.80% Performance-Related Pay
Tied to Stock
10.10% Non-Equity Long-Term 
Incentive Pay
40.10% Non-Equity Short-
Term Incentive Pay
Source: DSW 2011
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to the duties and performance of the members
of the management board and to standard
practice, the law draws on criteria usually
underlying compensation agreements in labor
markets, thus completing the parties’ optimal
contracting by compensating market weak-
nesses. At the same time, the criterion of stan-
dard practice integrates a vertical dimension
according to the internal payment structure of
the company. The latter, however, may have
unwanted incentive effects because tourna-
ment theory has shown that pay differentials
between job levels may influence employees’
motivation and their level of effort.
PAY COMPONENTS AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS
In addition to these basic parameters, the
amendment of 2009 tries to go even further,
indicating relevant criteria for the composition
of executive compensation and taking the sus-
tainable development of the company’s busi-
ness as a guideline. Unfortunately, the law
gives little guidance as to how to ensure a
workable implementation. All the legislator
does is indicate the time period to establish
and verify sustainability by providing for a
period of at least two years in § 87 (1) AktG
that the assessment of performance should
generally be based on. Such a one-size-fits-all
approach does not, however, allow for the
specific needs of different industries. In addi-
tion, the amendment of 2009 introduced
extended holding periods of four years for
stock options (§ 193 (2) AktG) in the interest
of long-term behavioral control and in light of
the widely spread criticism against adverse
incentives created by stock options throughout
the recent financial crisis.
This regulatory approach obviously relies on
an incentive effect flowing from variable and,
particularly, share-related pay components.
This assumption has been subject to growing
criticism in light of the recent findings of
empirical behavioral research. Empirical evi-
dence of a high responsiveness of stock
option pay for CEOs to stock price perform-
ance is not too convincing because – among
other things – causality can hardly be proved.
Considering the possible adverse effects of
incentive pay on intrinsic motivation, one
may conclude that the regulation of variable
pay and the mandatory extension of the
holding periods for stock options might be
arbitrary and lacking in empirical basis. This
finding seems to confirm the growing opinion
in German legal debate that economists have
failed to communicate convincingly their
findings about the alignment between share-
holder and executive interests in the regula-
tion of executive pay.
SAY ON PAY
Despite its non-mandatory character, the 
now widely accepted advisory vote of the
shareholder meeting introduced by the
Amendment of 2009 can be considered best
practice. Notwithstanding its non-binding
effect, it may lead to greater sensitivity in
remuneration matters, even though there is
no evidence for a slowdown in the continued
expansion of executive pay. However, practi-
cal experience in the U.K. indicates a growing
dialogue between the board and institutional
investors about compensation. The threat of
shareholder outrage over executive compen-
sation seems to be taken care of better than
before.
In conclusion, the German regulation of
benchmarks for reasonable compensation
seems to rest on a close alignment of executive
pay with market forces. There is, however, 
no empirical evidence for an actual align-
ment of the interests of management with
those of shareholders. At the same time, the
newly  in  tro  duced advisory shareholder
“say on pay” may help to reduce outrage
costs, evidencing a certain legislative mis-
trust towards managerial power that may not
be subject to market control.
REFERENCES
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Figure 2: Top Five Highest-Paid Named Executive Officers (NEOs)
5% Avg. Bonus
17% Base Salary 10% Avg. All Other Pay
51% Performance-Related Pay
Tied to Stock
17% Avg. Non-Equity
Incentive Pay
Source: ISS Compensation Database
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hief marketing officers are increas-
ingly coming under pressure to show
the positive impact of their marketing
activities on company performance. To
demonstrate this impact, they require
models that link customer metrics to
shareholder value. Similarly, investors
and financial analysts that regard cus-
tomers as the most important assets of a
company have a great interest in the link
between the value of these customers
(current and future, as captured by cus-
tomer equity) and shareholder value,
here operationalized as market capitali  -
zation. Establishing this link would give
them an alternative approach to compa-
ny valuation that could circumvent many
of the shortcomings in existing valuation
approaches.  
Existing models in marketing that link cus-
tomer metrics to shareholder value disregard
financial metrics, in particular companies’ debt
and non-operating assets (Gupta et al. 2004;
Rust et al. 2004). In contrast, most discounted
cash flow models in finance put little empha-
sis on customer metrics, such as the number of
customers and their retention rates (for a sum-
mary, see Damodaran 2006). Thus, they 
provide little information about how improve-
ments in marketing metrics, such as retention
rates or cross-selling rates, impact shareholder
value. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This article develops a new theoretical frame-
work for customer-based valuation, which
determines shareholder value and is grounded
in valuation theory. Its basic idea is to use
information about a company's customer base
to determine the appropriate market capital-
ization. Figure 1 indicates that the theoretical
framework for customer-based valuation con-
sists of two core modules. Module 1 links cus-
tomer equity to shareholder value and consid-
ers non-operating assets, debt and taxes. 
New, from a financial point of view, is that all
operational, tangible (e.g. equipment, build-
ings) and intangible (e.g. brands, knowledge,
patents) assets of the company are captured in
customer equity, which summarizes the
respective cash flows according to customers
or customer cohorts instead of periods. 
Module 2 calculates customer equity, here
defined as the present value of all current and
future customers. In its simplest form, cus-
tomer equity equals the number of current
and future customers times the average (net
present) value per current and future cus-
tomer. Ideally, the value per customer is calcu-
lated at the individual level, as is common in
models with access to internal, proprietary
information. However, valuation models that
must rely on less informative or publicly avail-
able information generally require a compro-
mise in the level of detail attained. Potential
alternatives to individual customer valuation
include grouping customers in period-based
cohorts or in segments, such as end consumers
versus business clients. This distinction offers
greater predictive accuracy than an aggregated
analysis. Moreover, it seems sensible to distin-
guish between current customers (certain,
because they have already been acquired) and
expected future customers, who entail uncer-
tainty and are more likely to introduce larger
errors into the model. The company also 
usually needs to invest more money to 
acquire them.
Customer equity must capture the present
value of the revenues and costs of all customers.
Whereas assigning revenues to customers is
LINKING CUSTOMER AND FINANCIAL METRICS TO 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE
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costs is more complicated, because some indirect
costs do not relate to the number of new or
total customers. The identification of such indi-
rect costs can account for decreasing marginal
costs and economies of scale. Thus, in the the-
oretical framework, customer equity (before
indirect costs) measures the present value of
the difference between revenues from all cus-
tomers and all customer-specific costs (i.e. 
profit contribution per customer), comparable
to the customer equity metric commonly
employed in previous research. However, this
measure of customer equity does not account
for indirect costs that can reduce shareholder
value, so customer equity (after indirect costs)
integrates the present value of all indirect (i.e.
non–customer-specific) costs.
APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This article applies the above theoretical frame-
work for customer-based valuation to two com-
panies in the media and telecommunications
industry (Netflix and Verizon) over six years to
analyze the influence of customer and financial
metrics on shareholder value. The results show
that it predicts market capitalization very well,
which should encourage the adoption of cus-
tomer-based valuation as a decision-making tool
in the marketing and the financial community.
Longer time horizons seem more appropriate
for calculating customer lifetime value or 
customer equity. The findings also challenge
previous notions about the dominant effect of
the retention rate and underline the importance
of predicting the number of future acquired cus-
tomers for a company. For companies whose
value is largely driven by customers, informa-
tion about their customer management activi-
ties and the corresponding customer metrics are
material. We advise such companies to disclose
their customer metrics to ensure their adher-
ence to existing legal requirements and reduce
information asymmetry.
LEVERAGE EFFECTS
This article also details how debt and non-oper-
ating assets introduce a leverage effect with
potential consequences so severe, that not only
investors and analysts, but also chief marketing
officers must be aware of it. The average lever-
age effect in more than 2,000 companies across
10 years is 1.55, which indicates that a 10%
increase in customer equity is amplified to a
15.5% increase in shareholder value. For the
chief marketing officer of the average firm, this
means that ignoring the leverage effect would
lead him to underestimate the impact of mar-
keting efforts on shareholder value by 55%. For
investors and financial analysts looking at the
average firm, failing to include the leverage
effect leads to a substantial over-estimation of
shareholder value by 35% on average.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework for Customer-Based Valuation
Segment 1
Cohort 3
x + x
Segment 1
Cohort 2
x + x
Segment 1
Cohort 3
x + x
Segment 1
Cohort 2
x + x
Segment 2
Cohort 1
Value of Current
Customer x
No. of Current
Customers +
Value of Future
Customer x
No. of Future
Customers
Segment 1
Cohort 3
x + x
Segment 1
Cohort 2
x
No. of Current
+ x
No. of Future
Segment 3
Cohort 1
Value of Current
Customer x
No. of Current
Customers +
Value of Future
Customer x
No. of Future
Customers
Financial Metric             Customer Metric     
Shareholder Value
Shareholder Value
(pre-tax)
Firm Value
Customer Equity
(after indirect costs)
Customer Equity
(before indirect costs)
Taxes
Debt
Non-Operating Assets
Indirect Costs
Discount Rate
Segment 1
Cohort 1
Value of Current
Customer x
No. of Current
Customers +
Value of Future
Customer x
No. of Future
Customers
Shareholder
Value
Firm Value
Customer
Equity
Module 1:
Link between Customer
Equity and Shareholder
Value
Module 2:
Calculation of 
Customer Equity
14 HOF-Newsletter  15.05.12  16:14  Seite 9O
ne major topic on the G-20 agenda is
the prevention of new risks arising
from shadow banking. In our memo for
the G-20 summit in Cannes in November
2011 we suggest a stricter congruence
between regulated financial territory and
the business model of banks and other
regulated financial institutions. We rec-
ommend imposing certain minimum regu  -
latory restrictions on all major counter-
parties of regulated banks and other
financial institutions. 
The shadow banking system includes entities
and activities that perform credit intermedia-
tion outside the regular banking system.
Credit relationships exposing regulated banks
to non-regulated, or less-regulated entities
outside the regular banking system may con-
tribute to systemic risk, as they imply maturi-
ty transformation or leverage, both of which
may provoke a run on borrowers, possibly
infecting the regular banking system. Even if
there were no effect on systemic risk, the
shadow banking system may serve to conduct
regulatory arbitrage, thereby undermining the
relevant regulatory principles of bank sound-
ness, and diluting their intended effects.
The shadow banking system is related in 
several ways to the current financial crisis. 
For example, the securitization of subprime
credit allowed overall mortgage lending to
expand greatly, contributing to the rise in US
housing prices. Similarly, the problems that
emerged in the wholesale (interbank) repo
lending market since the Lehman default
were closely related to the use of securitized
products as collateral, while the underlying
special purpose vehicles relied on short-term
funding from short-term money market
funds.
From a regulatory viewpoint, there are
therefore (at least) three economic reasons
for being interested in shadow banking:
shadow banking activities may contribute 
to systemic risk, they may allow for regula-
tory arbitrage, and they may pose an unnec-
essary, or undue risk to the consumer. In 
our view, it is imperative that new develop-
ments in the ‘shadow’ sectors of financial
markets be continuously monitored (and
understood). As shadow banking develops in
reaction to constraints imposed on regular
banking, the extension of regulation to non-
regulated entities has to be weighed against
the risks of new institutional forms arising in
response to this regulatory initiative. In our
memo, we make concrete suggestions for the
introduction of regulation of shadow bank-
ing, for the handling of systemic risk and for
further work on a comprehensive resolution
regime covering cross-border banking.
THE DEMARCATION RULE
We recommend mandating the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) to establish a qualified
task force to assess the costs and benefits of an
indirect approach to the regulation of shadow
banking that would allow regular banks to
enter into business transactions only with
counterparties that are themselves regulated.
This demarcation rule could be carried out in a)
a weak version in which the counterparties
need only be registered entities or b) in a
stronger version, wherein the counterparties
need to be properly regulated institutions
themselves.  
The weaker version of the demarcation rule
resembles the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) Project
of the FSB. It will allow collecting information
needed to map exposures between financial
institutions and financial entities as well as the
10
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14 HOF-Newsletter  15.05.12  16:14  Seite 10hierarchical holding structures that may exist
among these entities. Under the stronger ver-
sion, shadow banking and regular banking
would be treated alike. Feasibility of this rule
requires a formal “accreditation” of potential
counterparties by an international institution.
Important for the implementation of a demar-
cation rule is a joint approach by all major
financial centers, in particular the US and the
UK. We propose to stick to the weak version of
demarcation, as long as no international con-
sensus on demarcation has been reached, and
to move to a stronger version only in lock step.
RISK MAP
We recommend setting up a European institu-
tion comparable to the US Office of Financial
Research. This institution should have the
mandate and the resources for data gathering
and data analysis, to map the financial expo-
sures across and between institutions. The risk
map project is endorsed by the European
Central Bank and several other European
institutions (e. g. the European Systemic Risk
Board and the European Supervisory
Authorities). The realization of the risk map
project is the basis for any other regulatory
project on systemic risk monitoring.
SYSTEMIC RISK CHARGE
The information contained in the risk map can
be used to determine each entity’s contribu-
tion to systemic risk. On that basis, shadow
banking could be subjected to a systemic risk
charge, with the intent of internalizing the
externality (the contribution to systemic risk)
and filling bank rescue funds. Such a (Pigou-)
tax on shadow banks will also help avoid regu  -
latory arbitrage.
BANK RESTRUCTURING REGULATION
Our final recommendation addresses the need
to solve the “too-big-to-fail problem”. There are
three obstacles hindering restructuring legisla-
tion to be effective today: the lack of interna-
tional coordination, the absence of a strategy on
how to engineer the separation of a good from
a bad bank, and the failure to render haircuts
credible. We recommend setting up a task force
with an intercontinental mandate to further the
harmonization of regulation relating to the
restructuring of defaulting banks. Second, a suf-
ficiently staffed agency should preventively pre-
pare for the resolution of systemically important
institutions. Third, the role of haircut-takers
needs to be assigned to particular investors and
be communicated as such ex-ante. The obvious
candidates for this role are life insurance com-
panies and pension funds – both institutions
have very long debt durations and are the least
likely institutions to experience a run on their
assets. Holding haircut-able bank debt is lucra-
tive for these funds as the coupon of these
instruments will be high.
The full article is available at: 
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform/
shadow_banking_regulation  
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For further information on the Policy Platform at the House of Finance and to
download our publications please refer to our website:
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/policy_platform
SELECTED POLICY PLATFORM PUBLICATIONS
Böcking, H.-L., Gros, M. (2012)
“Stellungnahme zu den vom Deutschen Stan  dar  -
  disierungsrat vorgeschlagenen Änderungen der
Anforderungen an die Konzernlagebericht  -
erstattung”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Böcking, H.-L., Gros, M. (2012)
“Stellungnahme zu den DCGK-Änderungs  vor  -
schlägen der Regierungskommission Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex”, 
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Hackethal, A., Inderst, R. (2012)
“Wie lässt sich der Kundennutzen der Anlage  -
beratung steigern?”, 
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Herring, R., Schmidt, R. H. (2012)
“’The Economic Rationale for Financial
Regulation’ Reconsidered”,
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Issing, O. (2011)
“Der Weg aus der Krise”,
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Remsperger, H. (2012)
“Finanzstabilität im Bundestag”,
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Siekmann, H. (2012)
“Support Mechanisms Pose Fundamental Legal
Questions”, 
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Siekmann, H. (2012)
“Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Zweiten
Gesetzes zur Umsetzung eines Maßnahmen  pakets
zur Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes”, 
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Wieland, V. (2012)
“Next Hike End of 2014: FOMC Matches
Historical Responses to Member’s Forecasts and
Risks Repeating Earlier Mistakes”,
White Paper, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
Wieland, V., Wolters, M. (2012)
“Macroeconomic Model Comparisons and
Forecast Competition”, 
Policy Letter, Policy Platform at the House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt
14 HOF-Newsletter  15.05.12  16:14  Seite 1112
Interview • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 2/2012
THEORY NEEDS TO ADDRESS THE RIGHT KIND
OF POLICY QUESTIONS
Lars-Hendrik Röller is the Economic
Advisor to Chancellor Merkel as well
as G8 and G20 Sherpa. Previous posi-
tions include President of ESMT, Chief
Competition Economist of the Euro  -
pean Commission, Director at the
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Pro  fessor
at Humboldt University and Professor
at INSEAD, Fountainebleau. He is also
a Past-President of the German Eco  -
nomic Association and the European
Association for Research in Industrial
Economics (EARIE). Röller holds a
Ph.D. in Economics from the Univer  -
sity of Pennsylvania, a Master of Arts
in Economics, a Master of Science in
Artificial Intelligence both from the
University of Pennsylvania, and a
Bachelor of Science in Computer
Science from Texas A&M University.
Politicians often criticize academic advice to 
be too theoretical. Should economists take the
political feasibility of their proposals into
account when giving policy advice? 
I do not think that academic advice is too the-
oretical. Often, theory is the best guide for pol-
icy. However, theory needs to address the right
kind of policy questions. In the end, the rele-
vance of a theory is whether is addresses a rele-
vant question. This also applies to empirical
academic research which can be very fruitful
for policy as well. Taking political constraints
into account is one way of making a theory, 
or an empirical analysis, ask the right kind of
questions. When it comes to policy implemen-
tation, political, institutional and technical
constraints are often decisive. 
In the United States, it is common for academics
to temporarily leave academia to serve in 
political functions. Would Germany also profit
from such a regular exchange of experts
between politics and academia?
Revolving doors can be an effective way to
increase knowledge and experience on either
side; government as well as academia. Govern-
ments can benefit from academics, while
academia can benefit from having been
exposed to a policy environment. Taking the
government’s perspective, there are primarily
two channels through which academic econo-
mists have impact: either by having confiden-
tial input “inside” the house (for example 
the Chief Economist Team at the European
Commission), or by public “external” advice
through the media, think tanks or other aca-
demic institutions. 
What do you consider to be the most pressing
policy questions that economists should cur-
rently address in their research?
To my mind there is no most pressing policy
question. Clearly, the financial and economic
crisis has been dominating over the last couple
of years. The crisis has shown the importance
of institutional economics. However, there are
many other policy questions ranging from
labor market policies, financial market regula-
tion, innovation, and regulatory issues in gen-
eral. Understanding in these contexts how
markets work, or why they don’t work and
what the role of government should be,
remains a fundamental challenge.
Lars-Hendrik Röller   
Conference Announcement
STATE AID IN THE
BANKING MARKET
Legal and Economic Perspectives 
21 June, 2012, House of Finance
organized by the Institute for Monetary
and Financial Stability and the Policy
Platform at the House of Finance
Keynote Address 
Joaquín Alumnia,
European Commissioner for Competition
Speakers
Prof. Dr. Daniel Zimmer,
University of Bonn & Monopolkommission 
Athanasios Orphanides, Ph.D., 
former Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus 
Prof. Dr. h. c. mult. Martin Hellwig, 
MPI for Research on Collective Goods 
Prof. Dr. Joel Monéger, 
University Paris-Dauphine
14 HOF-Newsletter  15.05.12  16:14  Seite 1213
Selected HoF Publications • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 2/2012
SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Bülbül, D. (2012) 
“Determinants of trust in banking networks”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 
Cwik, T., Müller, G. J., Schmidt, S.,
Wieland, V., Wolters, M. (2012) 
“A New Comparative Approach to Macro  -
economic Modeling and Policy Analysis”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organisation
Faia, E. (2012) 
“Oligopolistic competition and optimal mone-
tary policy”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control
Gomber, P., Pujol, G., Wranik, A. (2012) 
“Best Execution Implementation and Broker
Policies in Fragmented European Equity
Markets”, 
International Review of Business Research
Papers, Vol. 8., Issue 2, pp. 144-162  
Haar, B. (2012) 
“Binnenmarkt und europäisches Gesell  -
schafts  recht in der aktuellen Rechtsprechung
des EuGHs”,  
forthcoming in Zeitschrift für Gemeinschafts  -
privatrecht (GPR)
Haliassos, M. (Ed.) (2013) 
“Financial Innovation: Too Much or Too
Little?”,  
forthcoming in Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Inderst, R., Ottaviani, M. (2012) 
“Financial Advice”,  
forthcoming in Journal of Economic
Literature
Kraft, J., Redenius-Hövermann, J. (2012) 
“Zur Einführung einer gesetzlichen Ge  sch  -
lechterquote im Aufsichts- oder Ver  wal  -
tungsrat einer SE”,  
Die Aktiengesellschaft, Vol 1+2, pp. 28-33
Marekwica, M., Maurer, R., Sebastian. S.
(2011) 
“Asset Meltdown – Fact or Fiction?”,  
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management,
Vol. 17, pp. 27-38
Prüfer, J., Walz, U. (2012) 
“Academic Faculty Governance and Re  cruit  -
ment Decisions”,  
forthcoming in Public Choice 
Siekmann, H. (2012) 
“Die Legende von der verfassungsrechtlichen
Sonderstellung des „anonymen“ Kapital  -
eigentums”,  
in Sachs/Siekmann (Eds.): Der grundrechts-
geprägte Verfassungsstaat, Festschrift für
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• Brigitte Haar has been invited to serve as a
Bok Visiting International Professor during
the 2012-2013 academic year by the Univer  -
sity of Penn  syl  vania Law School. Every year,
Penn Law invites several internationally
recog  nized experts in international and com-
parative law from around the world to its
premises in Philadelphia. 
• Wolfgang König and his team have been
elected to run a project on e-docs funded by
the German Federal Ministry of Education
and Research. For more efficient use of both
physical and financial resources, they will
develop standards that improve the electronic
exchange of documents. 
• For the third year in succession, the Commerz  -
bank Foundation will be supporting the
Doctor  ate/Ph.D. program Law and
Economics of Money and Finance with a
grant of € 15,500. The grant enables the pro-
gram director Brigitte Haar, as well as Roman
Beck at the E-Finance Lab, to invite interna-
tional faculty to help broaden the curriculum.
• Yulia Plyakha and Grigory Vilkov, House
of Finance, and Raman Uppal, EDHEC
Business School, have won first prize in S&P
Indices’ first annual SPIVA Awards program
for their study on equal-weigh  ted portfolios
(see HoF News  letter Q2/2011, pp. 4-5).
• The US Retirement Income Journal has listed a
paper co-authored by Raimond Maurer as
one of the top ten most significant academic
studies on retirement in 2011 (“Optimal Port  -
folio Choice over the Life-Cycle with Flexible
Work, Endogenous Retirement, and Lifetime
Payouts", Review of Finance, May 2011).
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NEW ENDOWED CHAIRS AT THE
HOUSE OF FINANCE
Two new endowed chairs have been im  ple  men  -
ted at the House of Finance, both connec  ted 
to the Depart  ment of Finance. The chairs are
funded by the DZ BANK Foundation and the
Helaba Landes  bank Hessen Thüringen via the
House of Finance Foundation.
Andreas Hackethal holds the new
House of Finance Endowed
Chair of Personal Finance –
supported by the DZ BANK
Foun  dation. The chair’s prime
focus fits the research interests of Hackethal,
who previously held the Chair of Finance.
The House of Finance Endowed
Chair of Finance and Accoun  -
ting – supported by the
Helaba will be held by Reinhard
H. Schmidt until his retirement.
Schmidt, formerly Professor of International
Banking and Finance, has been teaching at
Goethe University since 1991. 
RAIMOND MAURER RECEIVES 
HONORARY DOCTORATE
FINEC, the St. Petersburg State
Uni  versity of Economics and
Finance, has awarded an hono  -
rary doctorate to Prof. Raimond
Maurer (Chair of Invest  ment,
Portfolio Management, and Pension Finance)
at the House of Finance. FINEC is one of
Russia’s largest and most renowned universi-
ties for economics and finance. Maurer, who
has been cooperating with FINEC researchers
for 20 years, is only the 45
th recipient of an
honorary doctorate from the university in its
80-year history.
ING DIBA TO SUPPORT RETAIL
BANKING AND MARKETING-
RELATED ACTIVITIES  
ING DiBa AG has agreed to support research
activities at Goethe University in the area of
retail banking and marketing via the provi-
sion of funding, data and expert knowledge. 
The majority of funds will be allocated to
grants for doctoral students of the Graduate
School for Economics, Finance, and Mana  -
gement at the House of Finance. “This sup-
port will help to expand our very successful
research on solutions that im  prove the finan-
cial decisions of private households”, said
Andreas Hackethal, Dean of the Faculty of
Economics and Business Admini  stra  tion,
who himself conducts research on retail
banking. 
JAN PIETER KRAHNEN APPOINTED
TO NEW HIGH-LEVEL EU EXPERT
GROUP 
Jan Pieter Krahnen has been
appointed a member of the Euro  -
pean Commission’s new High-
Level Expert Group on Reforming
the Structure of the EU Banking
Sector. The expert group, chaired by Erkki
Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland,
was established in February 2012 by Michel
Barnier, the EU Commissioner for Internal
Market and Services. It will present its final
report to the Commission by the end of sum-
mer 2012. Krahnen, the only German mem-
ber in the group of nine, is “very honored” to
have been selected. “This task is very exciting.
We will tie together the multifaceted scientific
questions raised by the financial crisis”, he
said. Krahnen is a co-director of the Center for
Financial Studies and Professor of Corporate
Finance at the House of Finance. 
FRANKFURT FINANCE SUMMIT 2012  
Featuring a great number of distinguished
guests, lectures and panel discussions, the second
Frankfurt Finance Summit was a huge success.
This year, the event was held at Goethe
University’s Casino Building on March 20 and
21. The current economic situation in Europe
provided the participants from academia, 
politics, regulators and industry with a broad
range of topics connected to the overall theme
“Regaining Systemic Resilience”.
VOLKER WIELAND SUCCEEDS
STEFAN GERLACH AT THE IMFS  
Volker Wieland has taken on the
Endowed Chair of Monetary Eco  -
nomics, formerly held by Stefan
Gerlach, at the Institute for
Monetary and Financial Stability
(IMFS) at the House of Finance – Gerlach was
appointed Deputy Governor of the Central
Bank of Ireland in September 2011. Wieland
previously held the Chair of Monetary Theory
and Monetary Policy at the House of Finance.
The IMFS is composed of six chairs of which
three are financed by the publicly-funded
German foundation Stiftung Geld und
Währung – i.e. the Monetary Economics,
Finance and Economics, and Money,
Currency, and Central Bank Law chairs. The
institute adopts an integrated, interdisciplinary
approach to the economic and legal aspects of
monetary and financial stability.
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
Saturday, 14
th ILF Graduation
7 pm
Tuesday, 17
th ILF Breakfast Series
8.30 am  “Themen des Kanzleimittelstands”
AUGUST
Monday, 6
th – Ph.D. Program Law and Economics of 
Saturday, 11
th Money and Finance Summer School
“Law and Economics of Financial regulation”
Speaker: Martin Lodge, London School of
Economics; Kai Wegrich, Hertie School of
Governance; Charles K. Whitehead, Cornell
University, Law School
Tuesday, 14
th ILF Breakfast Series
8.30 am  “Themen des Kanzleimittelstands”
Monday, 20
th – ILF Summer School
Friday, 31
st “Banking and Capital Markets Law”
SEPTEMBER
Tuesday, 11
th ILF Breakfast Series
8.30 am  “Themen des Kanzleimittelstands”
Tuesday, 11
th ILF Panel Discussion
6 pm  “Kartelle, Recht und Finanzen”
Friday, 21
st – CFS Research Conference
Saturday, 22
nd “Household Finance”
9 am – 5 pm Organization: CFS, Einaudi Institute for
Economics and Finance, National Bureau of
Economic Research
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
JUNE
Saturday, 2
nd GBS Graduation 
3 pm Executive Master of Finance and Accounting,
Class of 2012
Monday, 4
th EFL Jour Fixe
5 pm  “Security Risks of Cloud Computing in
Financial Services”
Speaker: Olga Wenge
Monday, 4
th ILF Guest Lecture
7.30 pm  “Bank Resolution Regimes: Ensuring
Credibility”
Speaker: John Armour, Oxford University
Tuesday, 5
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 – 1.45 pm  “The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion”
Speaker: Matthias Kehrig, University of Texas
Tuesday, 5
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Magnus Dahlquist, Stockholm School
of Economics
Wednesday, 6
th ILF Panel Discussion
6 pm  “Bauen, Recht und Finanzen”
Monday, 11
th CFS Lecture
5.30 – 7 pm  “Beyond Our Means: Why America
Spends While the World Saves”
Speaker: Sheldon Garon, Princeton University
Thursday, 14
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: David Lagakos, Arizona State
University
Thursday, 14
th House of Finance Brown Bag Seminar
12 – 1 pm  Speaker: Volker Wieland
Friday, 15
th The ECB and Its Watchers XIV
8 am – 4.30 pm  Organization: Volker Wieland
Monday, 18
th ILF Career Day
9 am 
Tuesday, 19
th ILF Breakfast Series
8.30 am  “Themen des Kanzleimittelstands”
Tuesday, 19
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: David Yermack, NYU Stern
Thursday, 21
st House of Finance / IMFS Conference
2 pm  “State Aid in the Banking Market – 
Legal and Economic Perspectives”
Speaker: Joaquín Almunia, European
Commissioner for Competition,
Daniel Zimmer, University of Bonn, et al.
Friday, 22
nd Tagung
1 pm  “Was taugt der Wertpapierprospekt für
die Anlegerinformation?”
Organization: ILF & Hengeler Mueller
Monday, 25
th IMFS Distinguished Lecture
5 pm  Speaker: Jörg Asmussen, ECB
Tuesday, 26
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Zheng Liu, The Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco
Tuesday, 26
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Robert Kosowski, Imperial College
London
JULY
Monday, 2
nd EFL Jour Fixe
5 pm  “Determinants and Consequences of 
the IT Department’s Influence within 
the Firm”
Speaker: Tim Krämer
Tuesday, 3
rd Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Alex Stomber, HU Berlin
Thursday, 5
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Thomas Cosimano, University of
Notre Dame
Tuesday, 10
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm  Speaker: Anna Chernobai, Whitman School of
Management, Syracuse University
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